Abstract--In this article, we shall present an authenticated key agreement protocol which is a modified and faster version of the Yeh-Sun scheme. Compared with the latest Kobara-Imai scheme, our scheme takes fewer steps and less computation cost. Besides, we shall also propose a protected password change protocol that allows users to change their own passwords freely. (~)
INTRODUCTION
The rapid progress of networks facilitates more and more computers to connect together to exchange large amounts of information and share system resources. A session key is established to provide confidentiality of communication over an open network. The famous Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme [1] is used to establish a session key between two parties over an insecure network. However, the scheme is vulnerable to the man-in-middle attack because the adversary words such as natural language phrases that people can recognize without any assisting devices, password authentication schemes are simple and practical solutions to user identification.
By using a preshared password technique along with the Diffie-Hellman scheme, Seo and Sweeney [5] proposed a simple authenticated key agreement (SAKA) protocol without any symmetric cryptosystems (such as DES [6, 7] , Rijndael [8] , and others [9] ) or asymmetric cryptosysterns (such as RSA [10, 11] , E1Camal [12, 13] , etc.). Two parties online can use a preshared password technique to authenticate each other and apply the Diffie-Hellman scheme to establish a session key. Unfortunately, passwords are weak as secrets because they come from a rather limited set of possibilities; they are vulnerable to the password guessing attacks (dictionary attacks). Sun [14] , Tseng [15] , and Lu et al. [16] separately showed that the Seo-Sweeney SAKA scheme is insecure under the threat of the replay attack and off-line password guessing attack. At the same time, Lin et al. [17] and Tseng [15] separately proposed an improvement on the Seo-Sweeney SAKA scheme to withstand these attacks. However, Hsieh et al. [18] have pointed out that Lin et al. ' s is still vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack. On the other hand, Ku and Wang [19] have also shown that Tseng's scheme is vulnerable to the backward replay attack [20] and modification attack, and they gave an improvement on Tseng's scheme in the meantime.
In 2004, Yang et al. [21] examined all SAKA-related schemes [5, 15, 17, 19] and mounted a modification attack on those schemes to successfully cheat the two parties into believing in the wrong session key. Table 1 below is a summary table of the security of all those schemes. Recently, Yeh and Sun [22] , and Kobara and Imai [23] have also combined the preshared password technique and the Diffie-Hellman scheme to achieve the same purpose the SAKA scheme intends to, respectively. Both schemes can withstand those attacks shown in Table 1 and provide perfect forward secrecy [24] . Lee et al. [25] further proposed the parallel version of the Yeh-Sun scheme. Two parties in their scheme compute the message during the protocol simultaneously. In fact, the scheme still need that one of two parties to send out the request message first and then another one knows to prepare the reply message. Hence, the protocol is not real parallel.
In this paper, we shall present a simpler authenticated key agreement protocol by modifying the Yeh-Sun scheme, and we shall also present a new protected password change protocol which unlike the previously proposed schemes [5, 15, 17, 19, 22, 23] where the parties cannot arbitrarily change their own passwords, offers users the freedom of changing passwords at will. Moreover, compared with the latest Kobara-Imai scheme, our key agreement protocol takes fewer steps and less computation cost. Moreover, we not only give the heuristic security analysis, but also [26] . The provable security is demonstrated by reduction (see [26] for more detailed description).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will briefly review the Kobara-Imai scheme. Then, our modified Yeh-Sun key agreement protocol and new protected password change protocol will be presented in Section 3. The security of our schemes will be analyzed in Section 4. After that, we will compare the performance of our key agreement protocol with that of the Kobara-Imal scheme in Section 5. Finally, the concluding remarks will be made in Section 6.
REVIEW
OF THE KOBARA-IMAI SCHEME
The system publishes two large prime numbers p and q, such that q divides p -1. Let gl and g2 be two generators with order q in the Galois field CF(p) [23] . Assume that Alice and Bob share a secret password (pw) and three predetermined distinct values Tag A = (id AII idB II 01), Tag B = (ida II idB II 10) and TagAB = (ida II idB II 11), where idA and idB are separately identities of Alice and Bob, and II denotes the concatenation. Their key agreement protocol includes the following steps.
Step is a message authentication code [27] and the keying materials as its key K.
Step 4. 
OUR PROPOSED SCHEMES
In this section, we shall show our key agreement protocol and protected password change protocol in such order in the following subsections.
Simple Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol
Here, the same parameters {p, q, pw} in the Kobara-Imal scheme are used, but there is only one generator g with order q in GF(p) used in our schemes.
Step pw; it can be directly sent to Alice. Hence, Bob's computational complexity can be reduced by one XOR operation, and Alice's computational complexity can also be reduced by one XOR operation (She does not compute (RB @ pw) @ pw to recover RB.) in our scheme.
Protected Password Change Protocol
Assume that Alice wants to change her old password pw to a new password new pw, she needs to follow these steps.
Step 1". Alice----~Bob: RA @ pw II RA ® newpw Alice chooses a random number a 6 [1, q -1], computes RA = g~ rood p and sends
Step 2*. Bob---+Alice 
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we show the heuristic security analysis and the provable security analysis in the following sections, respectively.
Heuristic Security Analysis
Several possible attacks will be raised and fought against to demonstrate the security of our schemes. Here, we assume that Eve is an adversary. Our security definitions are as follows. reason, the protected password change protocol can also withstand the replay attack. Because some messages sent between the two parties are the same in [5, 15] , the schemes are vulnerable to the replay attack and backward replay attack. Nevertheless, the messages sent by Alice and Bob are different in both of our schemes, and therefore, Eve cannot intercept any message between them and then replay it to the other side.
MODIFICATION ATTACK ANALYSIS. Eve tries to modify the messages transferred between Alice and Bob and makes them believe in a wrong session key. Unlike 8AKA-related schemes [5, 15, 17, 19] , our schemes have the XOR operation and a one-way hash function to protect the messages transferred between Alice and Bob. Eve cannot replace the original value sent by Alice with a new one and then use its inversion to make Bob return to the original value. Therefore, Yang et al.'s modification attack [21] cannot threaten the security of our key agreement protocol. In our protected password change protocol, Eve modifies RA ~new pw to a random number RE in
Step 1". After receiving RAG pw II RE, Bob According to the above analyses, our schemes can withstand all those attacks shown in Table 1 .
Moreover, even when the password is compromised in our scheme, Eve may reveal RA = ga rood p and R B : gb rood p, but she still cannot reveal the old session key Key = H(g ab mod p). On the other hand, a stolen session key does not help an adversary to carry out a brute-force guessing attack on the password because KA and KB are under the protection of the one-way hash function H(.). In a word, our new scheme lives up to the requirement of perfect forward secrecy.
Provable Security Analysis
In this section, we shall employ and simplify the BPR model (see [26] for a more detailed description) to formally prove the security of SAKA and PPC in the random oracle model (ideal hash model).
Model
The model is principally used formally as follows.
DEFINE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPATING ENTITIES.
PROTOCOL PARTICIPANTS. A party may have several instances, called oracles, involved in distinct concurrent executions of the protocols. We denote some instance i with an identifier A as 1-ih.
LONG-LIVED KEYS. Two parties A and B share a common password pw. We call pw long-lived key and assume that the password is chosen independently and uniformly at random from the set {1,..., N}, where N is a constant, independent of the security parameter. ACCEPTING AND TERMINATING. There are two states, ACC(II~) and TERM(H~), for an oracle II~4. ACC(H~) = true denotes that II~4 has enough information to compute a session key (SK). At any time an oracle can accept messages right away. As soon as II~ is accepted, SK(II~), SID(H~4 ) and PID(H~) are defined. When an oracle sends or receives the last message of the protocol, receives an invalid message, or misses an expected message, the state of TERM(II~) is set to true. As long as II:4 is terminated, no message will be sent out.
DEFINE AN ADVERSARY'S CAPABILITIES.
The adversary ,4 has an endless supply of oracles and models various queries to them. Each query models a capability of the adversary, such as forward secrecy, know-key security, etc. The six queries and their responses are listed below.
• Send(II~, m): This query models A sending a message m to H~4. A gets back from his query the response which II~ would have generated in processing message m and updates SID, PID, and its state. A in the form Send(II~,start) initiates an execution of the protocol.
• Execute(II~, H~): This query modelsA obtaining an honest execution of the SAKA protocol in the middle of two oracles II~ and IIJB . Execute(H~, His) models ,4 obtaining an honest execution of the protocols between two oracles H~ and H~. This query may at first seem useless since A already can carry out an honest execution among oracles. Yet, the query is essential for properly dealing with password guessing attacks. • Hash(m): In the ideal hash model, A gets hashresults by making queries to a random oracle. After receiving this query, the random oracle will check whether m has been queried. If so, it returns the result previously generated to ,4; otherwise it generates a random number r and sends it to A, and stores (m, r) into the H-table, which is a record set used to record all previous hash queries. Figure 1 shows the initialization of both protocols. Figures 2 and 3 separately show how instances in the SAKA and PPC protocols behave in response to messages (runs the SAKA and PPC protocols).
FORMAL SPECIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOLS.
Before putting the protocols to work, each oracle sets ACC(II~) +--TERM(YI~) +--false; and SK(II~z ) +--SID(II~}) +--PID(II~) ~ null;.
Definitions of security
This section defines what constitutes the breaking of our SAKA and PPC protocols. To begin with, let's set the formal notions of security as follows. FRESHNESS. An oracle A is identified as fresh (or holds a fresh SK) if the following three conditions are satisfied:
(1) II~4 has been accepted, (2) no oracle has been asked for a corrupt query before II~ is accepted, and (3) neither II~ nor its partner has been asked for a reveal query.
PARTNERING. In SAKA and PPC protocols, we say two oracles H i and HJB are partnered if the following conditions are satisfied: COMPUTATIONAL DIFFIE-HELLMAN (CDH) ASSUMPTION. Let G = (g) be a cyclic of prime order q and x, y chosen at random in Zq. Let B be a CDH attacker that given a challenge ¢ = (gX,gy), and let ¢ be the probability that B can output an element z in G such that z = gZy. We denote this success probability as SuccCDH(B). The CDH problem is intractable if SuccCDH(B) is negligible.
ADVERSARY'S RESOURCES. The security can be formulated as a function of the amount of resources `4 obtains. The resources are as follows.
• t: time of computing; • qsei, qex, qre, qco, qh: the number of sendi, execute, reveal, corrupt, and hash queries separately made. Here, q~e is the total number of qsei. 
where tl is the running time of Succ CDH.
PROOF. There are three ways that might lead to `4 successfully attacking the AKE-security of the SAKA protocol. First, `4 might obtain the long-lived key and impersonate A or B by mounting the password guessing attack. Second, `4 might directly obtain the session key by solving the CDH problem. In the following, we shall analyze the probability of the two situations one by one. To analyze a situation, the others are assumed to be under some known probability.
PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACKS. A and B separately chooses a C Zq and b C Zq at random, which implies RA and RB are random numbers. Hence, A observes that the message (RA @ pw) returned from send1 is independent of other messages. Therefore, the adversary gets no advantage for the off-line password guessing attack. The probability of the on-line password guessing attack making way is bounded by qse and N as follows:
<~ qse --N The on-line guessing attack can be prevented by letting the server take the appropriate intervals between trials. Furthermore, we also provide the PPC protocol to allow clients to change their own passwords. This simulation is perfectly indistinguishable from any execution of the real SAKA protocol except for one execution in which the challenge ¢ is involved. The probability a of B correctly guessing the session key `4 will use test(H~) is the probability of cnt= i. Then, we have:
CDH ATTACK (SESSION KEY
Assume that `4 has broken the CDH problem (.4, outputting b' after the test query, wins), then at least one of the hash queries equals SK. The probability of B correctly choosing among the possible hash queries is: 1 qh From the above description, the probability SuccCDH(B) that B outputs z from the challenge ¢ is the probability s that .4 breaks the AKE-secure scheme multiplied by the probability a that B1 correctly guesses the moment at which ,4 breaks the AKE-secure scheme multiplied by the probability fl that B1 correctly chooses among the possible hash queries: 
where t 1 is the running time of SUCC CDH.
PaOOF. This proof is similar to the analysis of SAKA. We omit it here.
EFFICIENCY AND COMPARISON
In this section, we shall compare the computational complexity of our key agreement protocol with that of the Kobara-Imai scheme. To analyze the computational complexity, we first define the following notations.
TEXP the time for computing modular exponentiation. TMUL the time for computing modular multiplication. TMAC the time for computing the adopted MACK(.).
TH the time for computing the adopted H(.). TXOR the time for computing the XOR operation of two numbers.
Assume that in the Diffie-Hellman scheme's computation gC rood p, the length of the prime number p is 1024 bits, and the random number c is 160 bits. In our scheme, Alice computes (RA = g~ mod p) @ pw and sends it to Bob; it means the largest number of bytes for pw can be pw up to 128. Oppositely, when Alice computes g~ • g2 rood p and sends it to Bob, it means the largest number of bytes for pw is 20 in the Kobara-Imai scheme. Hence, the selectivity of pw in our scheme is more freedom (i.e., choose a sentence as a password). Table 2 . Computational complexity comparisons between our scheme and the Ko~ara-Imai scheme.
Our Scheme
Kobara-Imai Scheme Alice's computations 2TExP ÷ 3TH + 1TxoR 4TExP ~ 3TMAc -b 2TMuL Bob's computations 2TExP q-3TH Jr 1TxoR 4TExP -k 3TMAc -b 2TMuL Steps required 3 4 For simplicity, to compare the computational complexities of our scheme and the KobaraImal scheme, we assume that the password length in both schemes is 20 bytes. To compute gC mod p by repeatedly squaring and multiplying requires an average of 240 1024-bit modular multiplications (i.e., 1TEXP = 240TMuL) [27] . According to Table 2 , it is obvious that two parties' computational complexities in our scheme are more economical than in the Kobara-Imai scheme. Moreover, our scheme requires fewer steps to agree on a session key than the KobaraImai scheme, and we provide a password changing protocol. On the other hand, Alice and Bob should use predetermined values TagA, TagB, and TagAB to avoid the replay attack, backward replay attack (each message transferred is different) and generate a session key in the KobaraImai scheme. In our scheme, the distinct values RA and RB can easily be used to make each transferred message is different.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have proposed a slight improvement on the Yeh-Sun scheme to make it more efficient. In additional, we have designed a protected change password protocol to allow two parties to arbitrarily change their own password freely. Compared with other SAKA-related schemes, our schemes not only can withstand those attacks shown in Table 1 but also is more efficient.
